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I. Introduction
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, as formulated
by Arrow [1] and Debreu [5], states that every Pareto optimal allocation
of a convex economy with a finite number of commodities can be sus-
tained as a competitive equilibrium with an appropriate redistribution
of income. In subsequent work, Debreu [6] extended this theorem to a
general setting of a linear topological space of commodities and for-
malized the notion of a price system as a non-zero element of the top-
ological dual of such a space. The only additional requirement for the
infinite-dimensional set-up was the assumption that the aggregate pro-
duction set has an interior point.
More than twenty years after the initial work of Arrow-Debreu,
Guesnerie [8] extended the second fundamental theorem to non-convex
economies; in particular to economies with certain kinds of non-convex
technologies (production sets). Guesnerie showed that corresponding
to every Pareto optimal allocation of such an economy, there exists a
system of prices which are marginal cost prices for the non-convex pro-
duction sets and such that, with redistribution, competitive behavior
at these prices by the convex sector of the economy sustains the given
Pareto optimal allocation. Guesnerie formalized the notion of
marginal cost prices as the Dubovickii-Miljurin normal cone to a given
non-convex set. In a recent paper [10], Khan-Vohra have generalized
Guesnerie's results to economies with arbitrarily non-convex
production sets through the use of the Clarke-Rockafeller normal cone.
It is worth noting, however, that both [8] and [10] remain in the
setting of an Euclidean space of commodities.
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At this stage, a natural question arises as to whether the results
of Guesnerie-Khan-Vohra can be placed in a general setting of an infi-
nite dimensional commodity space much in the same spirit as Debreu's
extension of the Arrow-Debreu theory. We report such an extension
here. Our generalization is based on Rockafellar ' s [14, 15] extension
to locally convex spaces of the Clarke-Rockafellar theory of non-smooth
optimization (see [4]) and we make essential use of his concept of sets
which are epi-Lipschitzian at a particular point.
It is worth emphasizing that the full power of Rockafellar ' s theory
is needed for the results that we present in the sequel. Even though
economists use specific Banach spaces as the underlying commodity
space, typically they formulate the price system as a non-zero element
of the predual of such a Banach space; in addition to [6], see [2],
[11] or [12]. As such, they are in a locally convex set-up and without
the metric necessary for Clarke's [3] definition of his tangent cone.
Two final introductory remarks. So far, public goods have been
studied only in a finite dimensional setting and a secondary contribu-
tion of our paper is its treatment of public goods in the full gener-
ality of a locally convex space. How fruitful such an extension proves
to be in terms of the economics must remain an open question.
Secondly, it is worth pointing out that our results have no bearing for
exchange economies whose agents have preferences defined on consumption
sets with empty topological interiors. As of this writing, the
problems arising in this context have not been fully resolved even in
the convex setting, see Mas-Colell [13].
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the mathe-
matical preliminaries, Section 3 the economic model and principal
results and Section 4 the proofs.
2. Mathematical Preliminaries
Let E be an ordered linear topological space with a locally convex
Hausdorff topology T and with the ordering '. induced by the closed con-
vex cone K. Let E =* {xeE|x_> 0}.
Let E* be the topological dual of E and for any feE*, xeE, let the
evaluation be denoted by <f,x>.
For any positive integer k, let E denote the k-fold Cartesian pro-
duct of E and endowed with the product topology.
For any set C C E, CI C denotes the closure of C in E and for any
set B C E, C/B denotes set-theoretic subtraction. For any zeE,P(z)
denotes the collection of all neighborhoods of z.
We can now develop the mathematical concepts that we shall be
using. The following definition is taken from [15, p. 262-263].
Definition 2.1 . For any C C E, and any xeC, the tangent cone to C at
x, T(C,x), consists of yeE if and only if for all Y ew(y), there exist
X e-i(x) and X > such that (x* + uY) C\ C * <f> for all x' in C A X
and for all \i e (0,X).
Definition 2.2 . For any C C E, the polar cone of C, C , is given by
{peE*|<p,x> j< 0} .
Definition 2.3 . For any C C E, and any xeC, the normal cone to C at x,
N(C,x), is defined as T(C,x) .
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Definition 2.4 . For any C C E, and any xsC, the hypertangent cone to C
at x, H(C,x), is defined as { ye E | there exist Xe ~(x) , Ye:£> (y) , X > such
that (x' + uy*)eC for all x'eC C\ X, y'eY and ye(0,A)}.
Note that our definition of H(C,x) is identical to that of Clarke
[4, p. 57] and is slightly different from that of Rockafellar [15, p.
267].
Definition 2.5 . A set C C E is said to be epi-Lipschitzian at x if
there exists yeE such that yeH(C,x).
Proposition 2.1 (Rockafellar) . For any set C C E and any xeC, H(C,x)
is an open, convex cone with vertex 0. If C is epi-Lipschitzian at x,
T(C,x) = CI H(C,x). If, in addition, x is a boundary point of C, then
the set C = (E/C) \J { x} is likewise epi-Lipschitzian at x, and
T(C,x) = -T(C',x).
Proof : Follows directly from Corollary 2 of Rockafellar [15, p. 268]
given that our definition of H(C,x) coincides with that of the set K
defined in the last paragraph of p. 269 in [15]
.
From Rockafellar ' s Proposition we can deduce certain useful proper-
ties of epi-Lipschitzian sets. These are well known and we provide
proofs for completeness.
Lemma 2.1 . For any C C E and xeC,
(a) H(C,x) + = N(C,x) if H(C,x) t 4
.
(b) If C is epi-Lipschitzian at x and x is a boundary point of C,
then N(C,x) t {o}
.
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(c) If E has a non-empty interior and C + E CCorC-E CC+ + — + — '
then C is epi-Lipschitzian at any xeC.
Proof of Lemma 2.1
(a) By Proposition 2.1, H(C,x) CT(C,x) and therefore N(C,x) + C H(C,x)
.
To show the reverse inequality, suppose peH(C,x) and there
exists zeT(C,x) such that <p,z> > 0. Since the set
A = {veE|<p,v> > 0} is open, and T(C,x) = CI H(C,x), there
exists z such that <p,z> > and zeH(C,x)
,
a contradiction to
the fact that peH(C,x) .
(b) If N(C,x) = {0}, then T(C,x) = E and is an interior point of
T(C,x) and since H(C,x) t <j> , e H(C,x), i.e., there exists
ze&(0), XeS(x) and X > such that x» + uz'eC for x'eX P, C,
z'eZ and ue(0,A). But this implies that x + uz'eC for all
z' e Z, i.e., x is an interior point of C, a contradiction.
(c) Since E has an interior point there exists a z and Zetj(z)
such that Z C E . If C + E
+
C C, for any xeC, x + pz'eC
for z'eZ, ue(0,l). This means that for any xeC, there exist
Ze(.i(z), Xe'O(x) and X = 1 such that x' + uz'eC for x'eXHC,
z'eZ and pe(0,l). The other case is identical.
[
j
12 1 2
Lemma 2.2 . Let x = (x. ,x )eC xC where C and C are subsets of E.
Then, HCcScC^x) = H(C 1 ,x 1 )xH(C 2 ,x 2 ) and NCC^xC^x) = NCC^x ) x
2 2
N(C ,x ).
Proof . Follows from the definitions as in [4, Corollary 2.4.5]. | [
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*k
Lemma 2.3 . Let E*
k be the k-fold Cartesian product of E*. Then E
can be identified with the dual of E
k
such that for any x = (x
X )eB
,
x* = (x
*i )eE*
k
,
the canonical bilinear form is given by
k
*i 1.
<x*,x> = I <x ,x >.
1=1
Proof . See [9, p. 266].
3. The Model and Results
An economy consists of a finite number of
consumers and a finite
number of firms. We shall index consumers by t ,
t = 1.....T, and shall
assume that each has a consumption set X
C C E and a reflexive preference
relation > . Let the "better-than-set" for t at
x
C
be given by P (x )
= {yeX^y > x C } and the "no-worse-than-set" by p'V) = [y^ \y > t * I-
a t™, a i - 1 F and each has a production setFirms are indexed by j, J - l,..-»*j a b*u.u r
Y j C E. The aggregate endowment is denoted by
weE
+
.
An economy is
thus denoted by t = ((XC , >t >*. V% •) «* we shall need the
following concepts for it.
Definition 3.1 . ( (x** ) , (y* j ) ) is an allocation of £ if for .11
* c
v
t
-
, a11 - = i f v*
J
eY j and H x
t
- I y
J 1 ".
t = 1,...,T, x eX , for all j - l,. ..,«?, y ^
_
Definition 3.2 . An allocation ((«**),
(y*J» is Pareto optimal inhere
does not exist any other allocation ((x^.Cy
3
)) such that x'eP^x )
for all t and x
t
eP
t
(x*
t
) for at least one t.
For our first result, we shall need the
following assumptions.
A.l For all t and all «W , ?(,') - CI pV) and pV) - « ?<«')
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*
Theorem 3.1 . If ((x ),(y )) is a Pareto optimal allocation, (Al) is
—t *t i
satisfied and P (x ) and Y are respectively epi-Lipschitzian at
*t *1((x ),(y )), then there exists p*eE*, p* * such that
(a) -p^NCP^Cx
t ),x t ) for all t;
(b) p*eN(Y^,y j ) for all j.
Remark 3.1 . While A.l is a standard assumption in the economics
literature, Theorem 3.1 would not be of much economic interest if the
t , *t i
epi-Lipschitzian hypothesis for P (x ) and YJ is not generally
satisfied. It is, therefore, important that "desirability" and "free
disposal," which are assumptions frequently used in economics, are suf-
ficient conditions for these sets to be epi-Lipschitzian, provided E
has a non-empty interior. Formally, "desirability," is the assumption
that for all x e X
,
P (x ) + E C P (x ) and can be loosely stated as
"more is better." Likewise, "free disposal" is the assumption that
Y. - E C Y
,
3 + ~ j
and simply means that if a production plan is technologically feasible,
any other production plan which does not provide more of any output
and uses less of any output is also technologically feasible. In
either case, Lemma 2.1(c) guarantees that the sets are epi-Lipschitzian.
Corollary 3.1 . If for any t, P (x t ) is convex, then (a) in Theorem
t t *t * t
3.1 implies that there does not exist x eP (x ) such that <p , x > <
<p ,x >. If for any j, YJ is convex then (b) in Theorem 3.1 implies
— i * i * *jthat there does not exist yeYJ such that <p ,y > > <p ,y >•
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We invite the reader to compare our Corollary 3.1 with Theorem 2
in [6] and our Theorem 3.1 to Theorem 1 in [10].
Our next result extends Theorem 3.1 to economies with public goods.
Recall that a public good is a commodity whose consumption is identical
across individuals and such that each individual's consumption is equal
to aggregate supply, see [7] and the references therein to the papers
of Samuelson. Let E refer to the commodity space for private goods
IT
and E to that for public goods. We shall assume that both E and
g *
E are real, ordered, locally convex Hausdorff spaces. Let E = E x E
g
.
T g
where E is endowed with the product topology and the induced ordering.
An economy with public goods fc - ((X
,
>
f )i» (Y )i> w) is such
that for all t, X
Z
= (X
1
,
X
1
) where X
t C E , X CE are its projec-
*' g 7T - TT g — g
tions onto the space of private and public goods respectively. We
assume that X = X for all t; that YJ CE for all j and that weE,
g g
-
w = (w ,0), w eE . Let x and x refer to the consumption of the pri-
TT IT TT+ TT g
*t *1
vate and public goods respectively. ((x ),(y )) is an allocation for
-eG *1 i *t t *t *
p if for all j,yeY,x eX,x =x for all t, and
*t *N *j(Ex ,x ) - Zy < w . The definition of a Pareto optimal allocation
it g . — it
t
G
* J
for r\ is then identical to the one given in Definition 3.2. We shall
also need the following assumption on the desirability of public
goods
.
(A. 2) For all t, G? ,? ) e P
t
(x t ), x > x
11 implies O?,^) E P t ( x t ).
71 g g — g tt g
We can now present our second result.
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*t *t *1
Theorem 3.2 . If ((x ,x
a ),(y )) is a Pareto optimal allocation,
—t *t j(A1)-(A2) are satisfied, and P (x ) and Y are respectively epi-
*t *j * * * *
Lipschitzian at (x ),(y ), then there exist p £ E
,
p e E
,
* * g g
* * *t *
(p ,p ) * 0, p e E such that
tt
r
<y z 2
(a) I Pg - p
g
,
(b) -(p ,p
t
) e N(P t (x t ),x C ) for all t,
" g
(c) p e N(YJ ,y J ) for all j.
Theorem 3.2 is a direct generalization of Theorem 2 in [10] which
in turn generalized Foley's Theorem 1 in [7] to the non-convex setting.
4. Proofs
In this section we present proofs of the results stated in Section
3. We begin by proving Theorem 3.2. The proof of Theorem 3.1 will
then follow as an easy consequence.
k th
Let k = T+F and for v e E
,
let the t projection of v, t=l , ..., T,
be denoted by x and the j ' projection of v, j = T+l , ..., F, be
denoted by y . We can thus write v = ((x ), (y )).
We can now present a
Proof of Theorem 3.2 . Let v
k
= ((x C ), (y j )) z E
k
where k = T+F.
Define the following sets in E .
v(x*) = nJt U* t ) x n. Y jt j
W = {veEk |Ext : Eyj + w }
TT 'IT — .IT 7T
t J
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W* = {veE k* < ly2 } t = 1, ..., T
g ' g — g
W = w nwr
t g
JU
Since W is non-empty and v e W, T(W,v*) is non-empty. Given the
definition of V(x*), Lemma 2.2 implies that
(1) H(V(x*),v*) -I^HOP^x*')^**) x n.H(Y j ,y* j ).
Since the individual hypertangent cones are, by hypothesis, non-empty,
H(V(x*),v*) t {$}.
Next, we prove that H(V(x*) ,v*) f\ T(W, v*) = {£}. If not, there
exists v e ((x ), (y J )) such that v e H(V(x*),v*) C\ T(W,v*). Since
v £ H(V(x*),v*), we appeal to (1) to assert that for all t,
x e H(~P (x ),x ) and for all j , yJ e H(Y J ,y J ). This implies that
there exist U efi(0), X > for all t and U eQ(0), X. > for all
t t j J
j such that
(2) (x*
11
+ mCx
11
+ U )) C?t (x*) for all u e (0, X ), for all t,
(3) (y*J + y(yj + U.)) CYj for all u 6 (0, X.), for all j.
Now let U = nu x IIU.. Certainly U e(S(0). Since v e T(W,v*), we
t j
J
appeal to Definition 2.1 to assert the existence of X > such that
w
for all y e (0, X ),
w
(4) (v* + u(v+U)) f\ W t d>.
Now let X = Min[(XJ, (X.), X ]. Certainly X > 0. Pick u £ (0,X)
t j w
U * 0. Then there exists a = ((a ), (a J ) ) E U such that
-li-
es) (v* + u(v+a)) e W.
*t t
Since (x + u(x +U ) ) is an open set for all y > 0, we use A.l and
(2) to assert that
(6) (x^ + ITCx 11-*^)) e P C (x*) for all t.
From (3), we obtain
JL • • •
(7) (y J + "p~(yJ +a J )) e YJ for all j.
Moreover, (5) can be rewritten as
(8) ZU* 1 + u^-kx*)) < 2(y* j + uCyJ+aJ) + w
7T 7T7T — .IT TTTT IT
(8') (x* 1 +VUt +* t )) < E(y* j +7(yj +a j )) for all t
g g g - . g g g
Given A. 2, (6) and (8') imply
(9) ((x*
t
+ yCx^), Z(y* j +y(yj +a j ))) e P t (x* t ) for all t.
71 * j g g g
But (7), (8) and (9) contradict the Pareto optimality of v*
.
Since H(V(x*),v*) and T(W,v*) are non-empty, convex and disjoint
and H(V(x*),v*) is open (by Proposition 2.1), by the Hahn-Banach
theorem, there exists p t 0, peN(W,v*) and -peN(V(x*) ,v*) .
We shall now use the properties of T(W,v*) to characterize the
normal cone to W at v* , N(W,v*). Since W is a convex set, by [15,
Theorem 1] , T(W,v*) is the same as its closed tangent cone in the
sense of convex analysis, i.e., the set C(W,v*) = {Cl\J X (W-{v*})},
X>0
-12-
i k
For any zsE and any i, i=l, •••, T, define ra (z) e E to be the vec-
tor of zeros in all coordinates except for (z,0) in the i-th and last
coordinates
.
• • •
Clearly (m (z) + v*) and (-m (z) + v*) are elements of W. Hence m (z)
and -ra
X
(z) belong to C(W,v*) = T(W,v*). By Lemma 2.1(a), <P,v>_! for
all v £ T(W,v*). This implies <p,ra (z)> = for any zeE and i =
1,...,T. By Lemma 2.3, there exist p t eE* and p -;eE* such that for any
x y
J
v = ((x ),(yJ ))eE , <p,v> = £<p t ,x > + £<p i,y
J
>. Thus, for any
t x 3 y
zeE and i, k = 1,...,T, we have <p,m (z)> = <p i,z> + <p F,z> = =
tt x y
TT
J
TT
<p ,ra (z)> = <p k,z> + <p F,z>. This implies that for any t, t =
'
tt "tt
1,...,T, p t = p* . Similarly, by defining m (z) to be the vector of
TT
zero's except for (z,0) in the first and the (T+i)-th coordinate, we can
show that for any j, j = 1,...,F, p j = p . Moreover, since for any
mt -^tt
zeE , <p*,z> + <p
,
z > = 0, -p„ = p*.
tt tt y y fty
TT TT
For any z e E
, define nr(z) to be the vector consisting of7
g g g
(0,z ) in every coordinate 1, ..., T and T+j and zero everywhere else
*tLet p t = p . By the same argument as before, it can be shown that
X
g
g
* t * *
for all j, i=l, ..., F, p i = -p = -Ep* . Let p* = (p ,p ). Thus,
y„ g h g * gg t
(10) p = ((Pn >P )> •••» ^P^'Pg )« " P*» •••» "P*>-
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Since -p e N(V(x*),v*), we can use (10), (1) and Lemma 2.2 to
assert that
-(p*,?* 1 ) £ N(P t ( x
* t
),x*
t
) for all t,
11 g
p* e N(YJ ,y J ) for all j.
*t
Next, we show that p > for all t. If not, there exists t and
g
-
x e E such that < p , x > < 0. Since H(~P (x ),x ) * <j>, pick
o o
—t *t *t /-> *t
z e H(P (x ),x ). This implies that there exist Z e(^(z), X e 0(x )
and X > such that for all u e (0,X)
(Xr,"p t (x* t )) + uZ C P
t
(x*
t
).
t *t —t *t
This implies, given A.l, that (x'+pz 1 ) e P (x ) for any x' e X P (x )
and any z' e Z. This implies, given A. 2, that for any positive
— t *t
integer n, (x'+yz '+n)j (0,x) ) e P (x ). But then we have shown that
(X ?
t
(x*
t
)) + u(Z+n(0,x)) cT^x
C
).
—
—t *t *t
Hence (z+n(0,x)) e H(P (x ) ,x ) for all positive integers n. This
implies
* *t *t —
~ <(p »P ) , z > - n <p ,x > < 0.
* g g —
Sinze z e H(P (x ) ,x )
,
- < (P*. P*'), z > < 0,
TT g —
and we obtain an absurdity.
We can now assert that p* = (p ,p ) * 0. If not, then p = for
* g g
all t and hence from (10), p = 0, a contradiction.
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The proof is now complete.
Remark 4.1 . The version of the Hahn Banach theorem that we use in the
proof of Theorem 3.2 does not require E to be locally convex, only
that it be a topological vector space.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let V(x ) be defined as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 and let
k t i
W = { ve E
I
Z x <_ £ y
J
+ w} .
t J
The proof now follows from that of Theorem 3.2 if we use W instead of
w. p
Proof of Corollary 3.1 . The corollary follows easily from the result
that for a convex set ACE, zeA, T(A,z) is identical to the closed
tangent cone to A at z in the sense of convex analysis (see Theorem 1
in Rockafellar [15]). |~[
Remark 4.2 . Remark 4.1 also applies to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
-15-
REFERENCES
[1] Arrow, K. J., "An Extension of the Basic Theorem of Classical
Welfare Economics," Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium
(1951), University of California Press.
[2] Bewley, T. F. , "Existence of Equilibria in Economies with
Infinitely Many Commodities," Journal of Economic Theory
,
4
(1972), 514-540.
[3] Clarke, F. H. , "Generalized Gradients and Applications,"
Transactions of the American Math. Society
,
205 (1975), 247-262.
[4] Clarke, F. H. , Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis , John Wiley
(1983).
[5] Debreu, G. , "The Coefficient of Resource Utilization," Econometrica
19 (1951), 273-292.
[6] Debreu, G. , "Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum," Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences
,
40 (1954), 588-92.
[7] Foley, D. K. , "Lindahl ' s Solution and the Core of an Economy with
Public Goods," Econometrica
,
38 (1970), 66-72.
[8] Guesnerie, R. , "Pareto Optimality in Non-Convex Economies,"
Econometrica
,
43 (1975), 1-29.
[9] Horvath, J., Topological Vector Spaces and Distributions , Addison-
Wesley (1966).
[10] Khan, M. Ali and R. Vohra, "An Extension of the Second Welfare
Theorem to Economies with Non-Convexities and Public Goods,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics
,
(102) (1987), 223-241.
[11] Majumdar, M. , "Some General Theorems on Efficiency Prices with an
Infinite-Dimensional Commodity Space," Journal of Economic Theory ,
5 (1972), 1-13.
[12] Mas-Colell, A., "A Model of Equilibrium with Differentiated
Commodities," Journal of Mathematical Economics , 2 (1975), 263-295.
[13] Mas-Colell, A., "Notes on Pareto Optima in a Linear Space,"
Harvard University preprint, 1984.
[14] Rockafellar, R. T. , "Directionally Lipschitzian Functions and
Subdif ferential Calculus," Proceedings of the London Mathematical
Society , 39 (1979), 331-355.
-16-
[15] Rockafellar, R. T. , "Generalized Directional Derivatives and
Sabgradients of Nonconvex Functions," Canadian Journal of
Mathematics, XXXII (1980), 257-230.
D/291


